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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the optimal reaction of fiscal policy to permanent and 
transitory shocks to output in a model of smoothing of tax and public good supply. 
The model predicts that optimal reaction of public expenditures and deficits to 
transitory shocks should be countercyclical, while optimal reaction to permanent 
shocks should be a-cyclical. Using the Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology 
for identifying permanent and transitory shocks, we test these predictions for a 
sample of 22 OECD countries over the years 1963-2006. We find that both 
expenditures and deficits are countercyclical to transitory shocks, mainly through 
public transfers and mainly in recessions. We find that government investment is 
pro-cyclical with respect to permanent shocks, but total expenditures are not. 
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Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy: Permanent and Transitory Shocks 
1. Introduction 
Recently there is an increase in research on the cyclicality of fiscal policy. This research 
is both theoretical, asking how governments should react to output fluctuations, and 
empirical, studying how governments actually react to such fluctuations. This paper 
presents two main contributions to this research. The first contribution is that instead of 
considering only aggregate fluctuations, we decompose these fluctuations to permanent 
and to transitory shocks. We then analyze theoretically how a government should react to 
each of such shocks, and also study it empirically in OECD countries. Our second 
contribution is that we examine the motive of smoothing of public consumption over time 
and show that it should lead the government to run a counter-cyclical policy with respect 
to transitory shocks, namely a negative transitory shock should increase the supply of the 
public good relative to output. 
 The paper presents a simple model of a government that derives utility from its 
supply of the public good, it derives disutility from the taxes, since it is benevolent, and it 
derives disutility from the size of its debt relative to output, to avoid diverging debt 
levels. Maximization of this intertemporal utility by the government leads to a policy 
which is counter-cyclical with respect to transitory shocks, and a-cyclical with respect to 
permanent shocks. This holds both with respect to public expenditures and with respect to 
the deficit as well. We then test the model, using the Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
decomposition of cycles to transitory and permanent shocks in OECD countries, and find 
strong support to our theoretical results. 
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 The literature on cyclicality of fiscal policy began with the Keynesian theory, 
which advocated countercyclical fiscal policy in order to stimulate aggregate demand in 
times of recession.1 The first study of fiscal policy in the context of the neoclassical 
model was Barro (1979), who analyzes a government that minimizes the cost of taxation 
over time by smoothing the tax rate. Such a policy leads to counter-cyclicality of budget 
deficits, while public consumption is constant over time by assumption. Actually our 
theoretical model follows closely the approach of Barro (1979), but it adds smoothing of 
public good supply to smoothing of taxes, and it also adds to the analysis the distinction 
between transitory and permanent shocks. 
The theoretical literature on cyclicality of fiscal policy since Barro (1979) has 
been quite scarce.2 Much of it has focused on the role of various components of fiscal 
policy such as automatic stabilizers, in Christiano (1984) and Cohen and Follette (1999). 
Gordon and Leeper (2005) use a similar framework of intertemporal optimization of the 
government and reach a conclusion that counter-cyclical fiscal policy is undesirable, but 
they do not consider transitory shocks. There are a number of papers who make a 
distinction between demand and supply shocks with respect to fiscal policy, such as 
Cohen and Follette (1999) and Taylor (2000), but few focus on transitory and permanent 
shocks.3 
 Recently there has been renewed interest in cyclicality of fiscal policy, which is 
mainly empirical. This new empirical literature began with Galí (1994), Fiorito and 
Kollintzas (1994), and Fiorito (1997), who found that fiscal expenditures are counter-
                                                 
1
 See Hansen (1969) and Blinder and Solow (1974). 
2
 In the opening of his paper, Blinder (2004) states his frustration by quoting Solow: “Serious discussion of 
fiscal policy has almost disappeared.” 
3
 One example is Carey and Tanner (2005), who simulate optimal fiscal rules using empirically plausible 
parameters for permanent and transitory shocks.  
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cyclical or a-cyclical in developed countries. In contrast Gavin and Perotti (1997) found 
that fiscal policy is highly pro-cyclical in Latin American countries. These findings led to 
much research that re-examined these findings and corroborated them to a large extent. 
Lane (2003) shows that cyclicality of fiscal policy varies significantly across 
categories and also across OECD countries, but in most advanced economies they are 
counter-cyclical. Arreaza, Sørensen, and Yosha (1999) and Gali and Perotti (2003) find 
further support for counter-cyclical fiscal policy in EU and in OECD countries. Gali 
(2005) even finds that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical in all industrialized countries and 
that counter-cyclicality even intensified after 1991. Darby and Melitz (2007) find that 
social expenditures account for the vast majority of countercyclical fiscal policy. Fatas 
and Mihov (2003) find that most of the counter-cyclicality of deficits in developed 
countries is a result of the automatic stabilizers. As mentioned above, the findings in 
developing countries are very different. Talvi and Vegh (2005) show, based on a large 
sample of less developed countries, that government spending and taxes are highly pro-
cyclical. This finding is also corroborated by Akitoby et al (2004), by Alesina and 
Tabellini (2005), and by Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008). The main explanation for this 
difference in fiscal policy between developed and less developed countries is that 
governments in less developed countries face credit constraints, which force them to cut 
expenditures during recessions. Recently other explanations were offered, based on 
political economy, as in Talvi and Vegh (2005), Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Ilzetzki 
(2008). 
 This paper is related to this empirical literature and mainly to the research on 
OECD countries. Our main contribution is moving from testing the relation between 
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fiscal policy and output to testing the relations between fiscal policy and the transitory 
and permanent shocks separately. We show that the two types of shocks have very 
different effects on fiscal policy and the main counter-cyclical effect comes from the 
transitory shocks and not from the permanent ones. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of intertemporal 
optimal fiscal policy that reacts to permanent and temporary shocks. Section 3 describes 
the derivation of transitory and permanent shocks to output in a sample of 22 OECD 
countries. Section 4 outlines the empirical implications of the model and the general 
empirical strategy. Section 5 tests the cyclicality of public expenditures and deficits in 
OECD countries in reaction to temporary and permanent shocks. Section 6 concludes. In 
the appendices we examine robustness of the empirical results, by testing for individual 
countries, and by using the Arellano and Bond estimation. 
 
2. A model of Optimal Fiscal Policy 
We present a simple model in which the government maximizes a welfare function. The 
maximization determines both the level of taxation and the level of public expenditures, 
and consequently also the level of public debt. The government maximizes welfare in an 
uncertain environment, where output is driven by shocks. The reaction of the government 
to these shocks determines the cyclicality of fiscal policy. We go one step further and 
differentiate between transitory and permanent shocks to output. This enables us to 
distinguish between the optimal reactions of government to each type of shocks. We can 
therefore derive the cyclicality of optimal fiscal policy with respect to permanent and to 
transitory shocks separately. 
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 Assume that permanent output Yp changes over time as a result of permanent 
shocks pt in the following way: 
(1)  ),1(1 tptpt pYY += −  
Assume that the permanent shock pt is a random variable, independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.), with a positive expectation p > 0. Output is equal to permanent output 
with the addition of a temporary shock et: 
(2)  ).1( tptt eYY +=  
The random variable et is i.i.d. as well, but with expectation 0. Note that equations (1) 
and (2) imply that the p shocks are permanent while the e shocks are temporary and have 
an effect for one period only.4 
 Assume that the government is supplying one aggregate public good at an amount 
Gt in each period t. The public good can be financed either by taxes, which have a flat tax 
rate, Tt in period t, or by debt issue, where the amount of debt by the end of period t is Dt. 
The government temporal budget constraint is therefore: 
(3)  .)1(1 ttttt YTGrDD −++= −  
The government derives utility from supplying the public good and disutility from 
taxes, or utility from disposable income, which is income net of tax left to private 
consumption. Assume that utilities from the public good and from disposable income are 
concave. For simplicity assume that logarithmic utility functions, so temporal utility of 
the government from these two elements is: 
  ].)1ln[(ln ttt YTG −+α  
                                                 
4
 It is assumed that both shocks are exogenous, and especially that the transitory shock is not affected by 
fiscal policy. This is of course a simplifying assumption. This issue is dealt with in the empirical analysis. 
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Note, that since the government derives utility from G and disutility from T, it has an 
incentive to produce as much as possible public good and collect as little as possible 
taxes, and to finance all public consumption by debt, as shown in (3). This of course 
should not be possible and the model should also have a mechanism that prevents 
accumulating endless debt relative to output. Note that a no-Ponzi-game condition for the 
government is not always sufficient to rule out the solution of zero taxes and full supply 
of the public good. Hence, we assume a slightly stronger assumption, that the government 
has disutility from public debt, and more precisely from debt as a share of output. 
 We therefore assume that the government maximizes the following intertemporal 
utility, which in every period is affected positively by public good supply, by disposable 
income, and also negatively by the relative size of the public debt. For simplicity we 
assume that the rate of discount of the government is equal to the interest rate. Thus the 
government maximizes: 
(4)  ( ) .lnln)1(1lnln)1(
1
0
0∑
∞
=












−+++−+
+t t
t
tt
t
t
t Y
DdYT
Y
G
r
E βαα  
This utility function guarantees that the public debt to output ratio never exceeds the 
upper bound d.  
 We cannot derive a full analytic solution of the maximization of (4), but we can 
derive the optimal cyclical fiscal policy. Denote by Vt the optimal value of the 
government utility in period t. Then the Bellman equation in period 0 can be written as: 
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Using the government budget constraint (3) we can rewrite the Bellman equation by use 
of the debt and the tax rate only: 
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Note that the tax rate chosen in period 0 has no effect on the future public welfare 
except through public debt. Hence, V1 does not depend on current taxes but on debt only. 
We therefore can derive from the first order condition of (6) the optimal tax rate and the 
optimal amount of the public good, as functions of the levels of public debt: 
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 Substituting (7) and (8) in the Bellman condition (6) we get: 
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where )1ln()1(ln ααααε ++−≡ . From (9) it follows that the optimal value function V 
has the following shape: 
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Hence, the expectation in period 0 of the optimal value V1 is equal to: 
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As a result the first order condition of the Bellman equation (9) is: 
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It follows from this FOC that the optimal new debt depends on the old debt and on the 
temporary shock e0 only, so it is described by the following function f: 
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Note that rf +<< 10 1  and if the debt to output ratio is close to d we have 11 <f . 
Hence, the debt to output ratio does not diverge, but is bounded by d.  As for the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy, it follows from condition (12) that 02 <f  since 0<′ψ . 
Hence, the optimal debt policy reacts counter-cyclically to transitory shocks. The reason 
for this result is that when the shocks are transitory, the debt does not increase in the long 
run, and thus it efficiently acts as a shock absorber against transitory shocks.  Substituting 
(13) in (7) and (8) leads to: 
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Clearly, 0,0,0,0 2121 >><< tandtgg . Hence public expenditures are counter-cyclical 
with respect to transitory shocks. Interestingly they are a-cyclical with respect to 
permanent shocks. Taxes follow the same pattern. The intuition for these results is 
straightforward. When the economy experiences a temporary output shock, the 
government likes to increase public expenditure in the present but in all future periods as 
well. As a result taxes are increased, but also current public expenditures, though by less 
than output. Note also that the share of the public deficit in GDP is: 
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Hence, the deficit is negatively related to the lagged debt to output ratio and is negatively 
related to the transitory shock. The deficit is, therefore counter-cyclical with respect to 
transitory shocks. 
 
3. Permanent and Temporary Shocks in OECD Countries 
In this section we use the Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology to calculate 
permanent and transitory shocks for 22 OECD countries. According to this methodology, 
the vector X, including both the GDP and unemployment, follows a stationary process: 
(16)  I,)(where,)()(....)1()1()()0()(
0
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eVARjtejAteAteAtX
j
 
and where the sequence of matrices A is such that its upper left hand entries, a11(j), 
j=1,2,…, sum up to zero. This assumption implies that the transitory shocks er do not 
affect the level of GDP in the long-run, while the permanent shocks, ep, have a permanent 
effect on output. 
In order to apply the methodology we first run VAR equations for the difference 
of logarithm of GDP and unemployment, controlling for the logarithmic change of 
government expenditure (instrumented in a TSLS procedure).5 Although according to our 
theoretical model shocks are exogenous, from an empirical point of view we cannot 
completely ignore a causal relationship between government expenditure and output 
shocks.6 We therefore include government expenditure in the VAR equations. This is 
intended to ensure that the shocks we identify from the residuals, are exogenous to fiscal 
                                                 
5
  To assure stationarity, we used first differences of ln(unemployment). 
6
 See Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
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policy as much as possible. Since government expenditure includes cyclical components, 
we pursue a TSLS approach using the HP-filtered series as an instrument.7 
We run these equations for 22 OECD countries during the period 1963-2006. 
Then, by using the above identifying assumption, we solve the system according to the 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology and calculate the permanent and the transitory 
shocks. In Figure 1 we show the shocks for the different countries. It is interesting to note 
that some of the shocks are well known, like  the negative impact of the fall of former 
USSR in Finland's output (1990-1991) and the positive permanent impact of the German 
Unification (after 1991). In a more systematic analysis, Table 1 shows the impact of 
global shocks like the 1973, 1979 (negative) and 1986 (positive) oil shocks on the 
different countries. 
We also compare our shocks to those reported by Smets and Wouters (2007) for 
the US. They report the shocks classified into monetary and demand shocks (which are 
close to transitory shocks in our analysis), and productivity and mark-up shocks (which 
are close to our permanent shocks). In our comparison we have looked whether their 
demand shocks match our temporary shocks and whether their supply shocks match our 
permanent shocks. Out of 40 common observations, 43 percent of our transitory shocks 
match the sign of their demand shocks, and 61 percent of the permanent shocks. Out of 
21 (23) of the big temporary (permanent) shocks identified in our framework during the 
common part of the sample, where big is defined as bigger than half of the standard 
deviation, about 30 percent (two thirds) are identified as big demand (supply) shocks by 
Smets and Wouters. 
                                                 
7
 For an analysis of the cyclical component of government expenditure see Lamo, Perez and Shuknecht 
(2007). 
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Table 1 - Global Shocks 
 
This evidence allows us to conclude that the Blanchard and Quah methodology produces 
permanent and transitory shocks that are relatively consistent with our ex-ante 
expectations and with existing empirical evidence in the literature. 
 
4. Empirical Implications 
In this section we return to our theoretical model in order to derive its empirical 
implications, in order to test them with the data of these OECD countries. As shown in 
Section 2 the debt to output ratio is converging stochastically to a neighborhood of some 
long-run level. Denote this level by d*. We can rewrite a linear approximation of the 
main dynamic equation of the model (13) in the following way: 
 
  
Permanent Shock 
 
Number of  
Countries               % 
Temporary Shock 
 
Number of  
Countries         %  
Big  Temporary 
Shock  
Number of  
Countries         % 
1973 (-) 6 28.6  10  47.6  8 38.1  
1974 (-) 18 85.7 13  61.9 10  47.6  
1973-1974 (-) 18 85.7 16 76.2 15 71.4  
1979 (-) 8 38.1  10  47.6  5  23.8  
1986 (+) 9  42.9  4  19.0  2  9.5  
1993 (-) 17  77.3  12  54.5  10  45.5  
2000 (-) 6  27.3  11  50.0  7  31.8  
2001 (-) 13  59.1  13  59.1  7  31.8  
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Note that the coefficient a is positive but smaller than 1 and the coefficient b is positive. 
Substituting (17) in equation (8) we get: 
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Hence, public primary expenditure fluctuates around an average )1/( αα + , as is quite 
intuitive in light of the utility function between public and private consumption. The 
budgetary data usually reports the overall public expenditures E, which are the sum of 
public consumption, investment, transfers and interest payments. In our model this 
variable includes also the payment of interest for past debt, so that: 
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This equation describes the main empirical implication of the model and its main 
hypothesis is that b is positive. 
 But in our empirical analysis we will not test directly equation (19) but the 
difference of expenditures over time, and we do it for two reasons. The main reason is 
that as equation (19) itself reveals, the effect of the temporary shock on total expenditures 
is rather small, while the effect of the temporary shock on the change in expenditures in 
that period is much more pronounced. Hence, the difference equation of (19) is more 
likely to track the effect of the transitory shock on expenditures. The second reason is that 
all other studies of cyclicality of fiscal policy measure the response of the change in 
expenditures and following a similar test will make the results of this paper more 
comparable to the literature. 
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We therefore next calculate the difference over time of the logarithm of equation 
(19). Note that: 
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Hence a linear approximation of a difference of (19) over time is: 
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As a result, the rate of change of public expenditures is equal to: 
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Note, that the coefficient of 11 / −− YD  is small, so we can write the empirical 
implication of equation (20), namely the regression of the rate of change of public 
expenditures, in the following way: 
(21) d lnE(0) = B0 + B1 Temp(0) + B2 Temp(-1) + B3 Perm (0) + B4 def(-1) + B5 X(0). 
The coefficients of the regression should satisfy according to equation (20): B1 and B2 
have unclear signs, B3 is positive, and B4 is negative. X is a vector of control variables. 
Our main hypothesis is that temporary shocks have a negative effect on expenditures, 
namely that b is positive. This is translated to the condition that: 
(22)  B1 = - B2, and B1 < B3. 
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But note that if B1 comes out negative it means that b is not just positive but also greater 
than 1, namely this is a strong support to our result that the reaction of fiscal policy to 
temporary shocks is negative. 
We next examine the dynamics of deficits. From equations (15) and (17) it 
follows that: 
(23) 
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Again, the coefficient of 11 / −− YD  is small, so we can write the empirical implication of 
equation (24), namely the regression of the absolute change of deficits, in the following 
way: 
(25)  d [def(0)] = C0 + C1 Temp(0) + C2 Temp(-1) + C3 Perm (0) + C4 def(-1) + C5 X(0). 
The coefficients of this regression should satisfy according to equation (24): C3 is 
positive and C4 is negative, since a > r. The signs of C1 and C2 are ambiguous but it is 
clear that C1 = - C2, and that C3 > C1. Again if the sign of C1 comes out negative, it gives 
further support to the result that b is positive and that the deficit is counter-cyclical with 
respect to transitory shocks. 
In order to test our thesis we use the sample of 22 OECD countries, for the period 
1963 to 2006. We look at actual data on general government expenditure and budget 
deficits as a percent of GDP.8 For government expenditure we use the logarithmic change 
of government expenditure, deflated by GDP prices. As explained by Lane (2003), this 
measure accounts for real changes in government wages, and thus it is one of the 
                                                 
8
 For works that differentiate between actual data and ex-ante (planned) fiscal policy, see Golinelli and 
Momigliano (2006), and Beestma and Giuliodori (2008). 
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channels for cyclical policy. In all regressions we control for fixed effects for countries 
and years. 
 
5. Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries and Permanent and Temporary Shocks 
5.1 Government expenditure 
In Table 2 we test the cyclicality of expenditure to permanent (PERM) and temporary 
(TEMP) shocks. In the first column we use the main control variables together with the 
permanent and transitory shocks, according to equation (21). The significant control 
variables for expenditure are the logarithmic change of the population with one-year lag 
(POP(-1)) and the share of  children less than 15 years old in the population (POP15). We 
tried also the election dates (ELECT), and the share of 65+ years old in the population 
(POP65), but these variables were not significant. This column shows, in accordance to 
our model, that government expenditure reacts counter-cyclically to temporary shocks, 
since the effect of temporary shocks, which is significantly negative, is much smaller 
than the effect of the permanent shock, which is insignificantly different than 0. In the 
second regression we test whether the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty (MAAS) in 
the early nineties changed the cyclical behavior of the governments. In fact, Galí and 
Perotti (2003) found that policy became more countercyclical for countries that signed 
the Treaty. By using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the countries and 
years relevant in the Treaty and 0 otherwise, we found that the coefficient is not 
significant at 5 percent – i.e., policy continued to be countercyclical in a similar way. 
Finally, we perform a similar test for the countries participating at the Euro agreement 
(EURO), and find that in this case as well the change in behavior is not significant. In 
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summary, Table 2 shows that expenditures tend to react counter-cyclically to temporary 
shocks, in a strong way, as is predicted by the model. 
Table 2 – Expenditure Reaction to Permanent and Transitory Shocks 
(t statistic in parentheses, using fixed effects for countries and years) 
Dependent\ 
independent variable 
dlog(G) dlog(G) dlog(G) 
Equation number (1) (2) (3) 
Number of observations 841 841 841 
Period 1964-2006 1964-2006 1964-2006 
C  0.05   ***      (21.2)  0.05      ***    (21.3)  0.05     ***     (21.3) 
PERM -0.002            (-1.1) -0.001             (-0.7) -0.002             (-1.0) 
TEMP -0.014   ***    (-9.8) -0.015    ***    (-9.8) -0.014     ***   (-9.8) 
TEMP(-1) -0.001            (-0.8) -0.001             (-0.9) -0.001             (-0.8) 
dlog(POP(-1))  0.26                (1.6)  0.25                (1.6)  0.26        *        (1.6) 
dlog(POP15)  0.16      **      (2.1)  0.17       **       (2.1)  0.16       **       (2.1) 
DEFICIT/Y  (-1)  -0.004   ***    (-6.5) -0.004    ***    (-6.7) -0.004    ***    (-6.6) 
MAAS*PERM  -0.003             (-0.7)  
MAAS*TEMP   0.007     *        (1.8)  
EURO*PERM   -0.002             (-0.3) 
EURO*TEMP    0.007               (1.2) 
Durbin Watson 1.98 1.98 1.98 
Adj. R squared 0.38 0.38 0.38 
In all tables: * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Table 3 checks whether the countercyclical reaction to shocks is due to the 
reaction in recessions –negative shocks (REC) - or in expansions – positive shocks 
(EXP). We also check whether they are related to big – defined as more than half (BIG) 
and one (BIG 1) standard deviation of shocks - and persistent (PERS) shocks – defined as 
more than 4 consecutive years. The first regression tests whether the counter-cyclicality 
of expenditure is due to recessions (negative shocks) or expansions (positive shocks). The 
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significant coefficients are for temporary shocks, both in recessions and expansions with 
a higher coefficient in recessions. 
 
Table 3  - Cyclicality of Expenditure in Expansions and Recessions 
(t statistic in parentheses, using fixed effects for countries and years) 
Dependent\ 
independent variable 
dlog(G) dlog(G) dlog(G) dlog(G) 
Equation number (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of observations 841 841 841 575 
Period 1964-2006 1964-2006 1964-2006 1980-2006 
C  0.04    ***   (12.3)  0.04    ***   (13.8)  0.04   ***   (18.3)  0.03     ***    (7.8) 
Temporary Recession      
Permanent Recession     
REC*PERM -0.001          (-0.4)   -0.002          (-0.6) 
REC*TEMP -0.020   ***  (-7.5) -0.020   ***  (-7.5)  -0.023   ***  (-6.1) 
EXP*PERM -0.002          (-0.8)   -0.003          (-0.7) 
EXP*TEMP -0.008   ***  (-3.0) -0.008   ***  (-3.0)  -0.013   ***  (-3.6) 
TEMP(-1) -0.002          (-1.1) -0.002          (-1.2) -0.002          (-1.4)  0.002            (1.2) 
dlog(POP(-1))  0.25              (1.6)  0.25              (1.6)  0.21              (1.3)  0.21              (1.3) 
dlog(POP15)  0.16      **    (2.0)  0.16      **    (2.0)  0.16      **     (2.0)  0.10               (1.1) 
DEFICIT/Y  (-1)  -0.003  ***   (-6.2)  -0.003  ***  (-6.2)  -0.003  ***   (-6.4)  
REC_PERS*PERM  -0.002          (-0.5)   
EXP_PERS*PERM   0.0009         (0.2)   
BIG1R_PERS*PERM   -0.002          (-0.5)  
BIG1E_PERS*PERM   -0.002          (-0.4)  
BIG_REC*TEMP   -0.021  ***   (-8.3)  
BIG_EXP*TEMP   -0.010  ***   (-4.3)  
Durbin Watson  1.99 1.99 2.0 2.0 
Adj. R squared 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 
 
A similar result is obtained when we look at persistent permanent shocks: 
coefficients are not significant while they remain significant for temporary shocks. These 
results allow us to conclude that while expenditure is countercyclical with respect to 
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temporary shocks, there is no evidence of pro-cyclicality with respect to permanent 
shocks. In the third regression we look at big temporary shocks: significance of 
coefficients remain in both expansions and recessions (with a higher coefficient). The 
fourth regression relates to Perotti (2005), who found a significant change in his 
assessment of the impact of fiscal policy since 1980. In regression 4 we check the 
reaction of fiscal policy in this period and we find a very similar pattern.  
Table 4 looks at the components of expenditure, as in Lane (2003). We look at 
transfers (GT), government consumption (GC) and government investment (GI). The first 
regression is for transfers, which is one of the two main items together with government 
consumption. The control variables include the change in unemployment (d(U)), in order 
to see whether the countercyclicality of transfers is beyond the one of unemployment 
payments. Results show that the coefficient of transitory shocks is significant, i.e., 
transfer payments react countercyclically to temporary shocks. This finding is in line with 
findings by Melitz (2005) and Darby and Melitz (2007). The second regression is for 
government consumption, and we found that coefficients are not significant at 5 percent. 
Finally, results for public investment show that they are procyclical against permanent 
shocks. In order to learn more about these results we proceed as in the previous analysis 
by differentiating between expansions and recessions. Column 4 reports this test for 
transfers, showing that countercyclicality is due to recessions. Column 5 reports the 
results for government consumption. Concerning investment, results show that 
procyclicality occurs both in expansions and recessions (significant at 10 percent).  
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Table 4 – Reaction of Expenditure Components to Permanent and Temporary 
Shocks 
(t statistic in parentheses, using fixed effects for countries and years) 
Dependent\ 
Independent 
variable 
dlog(GT) dlog(GC) dlog(GI) dlog(GT) dlog(GC) dlog(GI) 
Equation number (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Number of 
observations 
802 818 800 802 818 800 
Period 1964-2006 1964-2006 1964-2006 1964-2006 1964-2006 1964-2006 
C  0.05  *** (16.6)  0.05  *** (29.6)  0.07   ***  (9.5) 0.05   ***  (10.8)  0.05  *** (19.2)  0.07   ***  (6.2) 
PERM 0.001         (0.3)  0.001       ( 1.2)  0.017  *** (3.3)    
TEMP -0.003   *  (-1.9) -0.002  *   (-1.7) -0.013  **  (-2.5)    
TEMP(-1) -0.002       (-1.4) -0.004*** (-4.0) -0.005       (-1.0) -0.003       (-1.6) -0.004 *** (-3.9) -0.005       (-1.0) 
REC*PERM    -0.003       (-1.1) 0.0004       (0.2) 0.017    *    (1.7) 
REC*TEMP    -0.006   *   (-1.9) 0.0003       (0.2) -0.010       (-1.0) 
EXP*PERM     0.005       ( 1.5) 0.002         (1.1) 0.018    *    (1.8) 
EXP*TEMP    -0.0002     (-0.1) -0.004       (-2.0) -0.015       (-1.6) 
dlog POP15)  0.27  ***   (3.0) 0.001         (0.0)  0.44          (1.6) 0.26   ***   ( 3.0) 0.002         (0.0)  0.44          (1.6) 
DEFICIT/Y  (-1) -0.002 ***(-3.5) -0.002 ***(-5.7) -0.006 ***(-3.2) -0.002 ***(-3.2) -0.002 ***(-5.7) -0.006 ***(-3.2) 
dlog POP65)  0.001        (0.0)   0.007         (0.0)   
dlog(POP(-1))  0.06           (0.5)  0.66          (1.2)  0.06           (0.5) 0.66           (1.2) 
D(U)  0.01  ***   (5.8)   0.01    ***  (5.5)   
Durbin Watson 1.7 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.6 2.0 
Adj. R squared 0.48 0.20 0.20 0.48 0.19 0.19 
 
5.2 Government budget deficit 
Table 5 focuses on the general government deficit. The control variables used for the 
deficit are different from those for expenditure. Following Barro (1979), we use the 
control variable of temporary expenditure (like war-related spending), measured as the 
gap between actual expenditure and its HP-filtered trend. We control for "one-time" 
expenditures in the spirit of Barro (1979) by a variable of particularly high deviations 
from trend – more than one standard deviation. We use this variable, GYGAP, also with a 
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one year lag. Another control variable, which turns to be significant, is election years 
(ELECT), as implied by the political economy literature.9 
 
Table 5 – Deficit Reaction to Temporary and Permanent Shocks 
(TSLS1,t statistic in parentheses, using fixed effects for countries and years) 
 
Dependent\ 
Independent variable 
d(DEFY) d(DEFY) d(DEFY) 
Equation number (1) (2) (3) 
Number of observations 815 815 815 
Period 1964-2006 1964-2006 1964-2006 
C 0.21      **     (2.4) 0.20      **     (2.3) 0.20       **     (2.3) 
TEMP -0.17    ***   (-2.7) -0.19    ***  (-2.7) -0.18    ***   (-2.6) 
TEMP(-1) -0.02            (-0.2) 0.0003          (0.0) -0.01            (-0.1) 
PERM 0.65              (0.4) 0.72              (0.4) 0.64              (0.4) 
ELECT 0.21               (1.4) 0.22               (1.5) 0.21               (1.4) 
GYGAP 0.56     ***    (6.7) 0.56      ***   (6.5) 0.56     ***    (6.9) 
GYGAP(-1) -0.45    ***   (-3.1) -0.47    ***   (-3.1) -0.45    ***   (-3.2) 
MAAS*TEMP  0.13             ( 0.8)  
MAAS*TEMP(-1)  -0.13            (-0.7)  
EURO*TEMP   0.001          (0.01) 
EURO*TEMP(-1)   -0.12            (-0.3) 
d(U) 0.69               ( 1.6) 0.71              ( 1.6) 0.69               ( 1.6) 
DEFICIT/Y  (-1) -0.17    ***   (-5.6) -0.17    ***   (-5.4) -0.17    ***   (-5.4) 
Durbin Watson  2.1  2.1 2.1 
Adj. R squared  0.43 0.41 0.43 
 
 
The first regression tests whether changes in the deficit/output ratio are related to 
temporary shocks. It shows that, similar to expenditures and consistently with the 
theoretical model, deficits are counter-cyclical to temporary shocks. In the second 
                                                 
9
 This variable is insignificant for expenditure. It suggests that in elections governments reduce taxes. In a 
regression of revenues on ELECT (controlling for GDP changes), we found a significant negative effect. 
1. Instrument variable to d(u) is  D(Uhp), where Uhp is the HP filtered trend of 
unemployment. 
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regression we check whether there was a change in behavior for countries that joined the 
Maastricht Treaty. Results are not significant. This is also the case for countries joining 
the Euro agreement (third regression). 
Table 6 checks the cyclicality of deficits in expansions and recessions. The first 
regression shows a similar result to the one found for expenditures: the counter-
cyclicality with respect to temporary shocks is mainly for recessions, although the 
significant result was found for a one-year lag. Concerning expansions the coefficient is 
significant both for contemporary and for one-year lag coefficients, with an opposite sign. 
In the next regression we test the reaction to big shocks, larger than half standard 
deviation, and we get similar results compared to the ones for all shocks. The last 
regression concentrates on a shorter sample, beginning at 1980. It shows a counter-
cyclical reaction in recessions with respect to temporary shocks, with a one-year lag. 
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Table 6 – Cyclicality of Deficits in Expansions and Recessions 
(TSLS1, t statistic in parentheses, using fixed effects for countries and years) 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the optimal reaction of fiscal policy to permanent and transitory 
shocks. In an uncertain environment, we find that the optimal reaction to a temporary 
shock is countercyclical due to smoothing of tax rates and of consumption of the public 
good. Concerning permanent shocks, our theoretical model suggests that reaction to 
permanent shocks should be a-cyclical. By using Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
Dependent\ Independent variable d(DEFY) d(DEFY) d(DEFY) 
Equation number (1) (2) (3) 
Number of observations 815 815 575 
Period 1964-2006 1964-2006 1980-2006 
C 0.11               (0.6) 0.19       *      (1.7) -0.05             (-0.2) 
PERM -0.17            (-0.1) 0.30              (0.1) 0.32               (0.3) 
TEMP*EXP -0.30      **    (-1.9)  -0.13             (-1.1) 
TEMP*REC -0.03             (-0.2)  -0.21              (-0.8) 
TEMP(-1)*EXP 0.28        *     ( 1.7)  0.25                (1.1) 
TEMP(-1)*REC -0.25     **    (-2.5)  -0.33      **    (-2.3) 
ELECT 0.26        *     (1.8) 0.24               (1.3) 0.21                (1.4) 
GYGAP 0.54      ***   (6.8) 0.56      ***   (5.0) 0.66     ***     (7.4) 
GYGAP(-1) -0.40     ***  (-2.9) -0.45      **   (-2.2) -0.52    ***    (-4.2) 
BIG*TEMP*EXP  -0.27             (-1.2)  
BIG*TEMP*REC  -0.02            (-0.2)  
BIG*TEMP(-1)*EXP  -0.19               (1.5)  
BIG*TEMP(-1)*REC  -0.15              (-0.9)  
d(U) 0.48                ( 1.2) 0.59                (0.9) 0.53       *       (1.9) 
DEFICIT/Y  (-1) -0.18     ***   (-6.9) -0.17   ***     (-5.4) -0.15     ***   (-6.2) 
Durbin Watson 2.1 2.1 2.0 
Adj. R squared 0.54 0.51 0.60 
1. Instrument variable for d(u):  d(Uhp). 
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methodology for differentiating between permanent and temporary shocks, we test these 
implications for a sample of 22 OECD countries in the period 1963-2006 using both 
panel and individual country regressions. We find that both deficits and expenditures 
react counter-cyclically to temporary shocks, mainly through public transfers and mainly 
in recessions. We did not find evidence of pro-cyclical expenditure policy when reacting 
to permanent shocks, except for government investment. 
This paper is a first exploration in the direction of the differential reaction of 
fiscal policy to permanent vs. transitory shocks. It shows that the difference is significant 
and should be further explored. One possible extension is to examine this issue in less 
developed countries, unlike our sample of OECD countries. It would be interesting to 
examine whether less developed countries differ in their fiscal policy because they differ 
in the type of output shocks they face, namely are their shocks more permanent than 
transitory? If on the contrary it is found that they face similar shocks, then it would lend 
support to the view that their pro-cyclical fiscal policies are caused by other reasons, like 
credit constraints. 
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Figure 1 – Permanent and Temporary Shocks in OECD Countries 
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Appendix 
I: Individual Country Estimations of Government Expenditure Reaction to 
Permanent and Transitory Shocks  
 
In this appendix we apply the first regression in table 2 for each country individually: 
dlog(G) =  B0 + B1 Temp(0) + B2 Temp(-1) + B3 Perm (0) + B4 def(-1) + B5 dlog(pop(-
1)) + B6 dlog(pop15). 
 
The coefficients for the Temp, Temp(-1) and Perm are reported in the table below. 
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Table A.1 – Expenditure Reaction to Permanent and Transitory Shocks  
(t statistic in parentheses) 
 
Independent variable: dlog(g) 
country period obs. perm Temp temp(-1) Adj. R2 D.W 
Australia 1968-2006 39 0.02  ***   (5.1) -0.03 *** (-6.5)  -0.01 *** (-3.2)  0.67 0.93 
Austria 1972-2006 35 0.01   **    (2.1) -0.009 * (-1.96) -0.0002   (-0.0) 0.25 1.42 
Belgium 1964-2006 43 -0.01  **  (-2.0) -0.02 *** (-4.5) 0.005       (1.0) 0.59 0.68 
Canada 1964-2006 43 -0.01 *** (-3.0) 0.007   *   (1.7) 0.005       (1.1) 0.38 1.18 
Denmark 1972-2006 35 0.007   *   (1.9) -0.008 ** (-2.3) -0.005     (-1.3) 0.47 2.12 
Finland 1964-2006 43 -0.007     (-1.5)   -0.010 *  (-1.9) -0.01 *** (-2.8) 0.35 1.79 
France 1964-2006 43 0.007 *** (3.1) -0.01 *** (-5.1)  -0.005 **(-2.2) 0.68 1.69 
Germany 1964-2006 43 0.003       (1.0) -0.02 *** (-6.5) -0.002     (-0.6) 0.70 1.16 
Greece 1972-2006 35 -0.007     (-1.0) -0.02  **  (-2.5) 0.007       (0.9) 0.26 1.60 
Iceland 1969-2006 38 -0.04 *** (-6.9) -0.01 **   (-2.3)  -0.02 *** (-3.2)  0.72 1.32 
Ireland 1964-2006 43 -0.003     (-0.4) -0.004     (-0.6) -0.01       (-1.5) 0.20 1.81 
Italy 1964-2006 43 -0.01 *** (-3.4) 0.002       (0.5) -0.003     (-0.9) 0.55 1.66 
Japan 1964-2006 43 0.01 ***  (-3.2) -0.009 ** (-2.1) -0.005     (-1.3) 0.71 1.50 
Netherlands 1972-2006 35 -0.03 *** (-6.7) 0.004       (1.1) -0.005     (-1.4) 0.69 1.83 
New Zealand 1988-2006 19 -0.004     (-0.5) 0.001       (0.2) 0.0003    (0.0) 0.38 2.26 
Norway 1964-2006 43 0.02 ***  (-3.0) -0.03 *** (-3.6) -0.0001   (-0.0) 0.29 1.60 
Portugal 1974-2006 33 -0.009     (-1.3) -0.11***(-14.8) -0.01      (-1.3) 0.93 1.18 
Spain 1964-2006 43 0.002       (0.3) -0.04 *** (-4.6) -0.0004   (-0.0) 0.53 1.09 
Sweden 1967-2006 40 -0.01  **  (-2.1) -0.004     (-0.6) 0.007       (1.4) 0.28 1.88 
Switzerland 1991-2006 16 -0.01       (-1.0)  0.01         (0.3) 0.03         (1.4) 0.25 2.59 
UK 1964-2006 43 -0.02 *** (-3.2) -0.02 *** (-3.7) 0.0009     (0.2) 0.38 1.94 
USA 1964-2006 43 -0.008 *   (-2.0)  0.004       (1.1) 0.005       (1.3) 0.04 1.35 
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II: Government policy Reaction to Permanent and Transitory Shocks using 
Arellano Bond Estimation Technique 
Since our VAR regressions use as a control variable the change in government 
expenditure (instrumented by its HP filtered trend), one possible interpretation is that 
TEMP and TEMP(-1) are functions of the dependent variable. In that case the usual 
assumptions of a lack of autocorrelation would not apply. To correct for this possible bias 
we show in this appendix results using the Arellano and Bond technique, which copes 
with this drawback. The reported t statistics are based on robust standard deviations. 
 
Table A.2 – Expenditure and Deficit Reaction to Permanent and Transitory Shocks  
(t statistic in parentheses) 
Dependent\ 
independent variable 
dlog (G) d(DEFY) 
Equation number (1) (2) 
Number of observations 819 781 
Period 1965-2006 1965-2006 
PERM -0.0003          (-0.1) 0.06                 (0.8) 
TEMP -0.013   ***    (-3.1) -0.31     ***    (-3.5) 
TEMP(-1) -0.004      *    (-1.9) -0.08               (-1.1) 
dlog POP(-1))  -0.08              (-0.4)  
dlog POP15)  0.12                (1.3) 
 
DEFICIT/Y  (-1)   -0.02    ***   (-3.5) -1.4      ***     (-10.1) 
ELECT  0.29         *       (1.8) 
GYGAP  0.23     ***      (3.6) 
GYGAP(-1)  0.32     **         (2.3) 
d(U)  1.1       ***     (5.1) 
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